29 However, the question of why disagreements take place as if they were real remains to be explained. The obvious answer seems to be that those who are wrong are not aware of it and those who are incorrect do not want to acknowledge the real situation. If so, why haven`t these facts been discovered yet? One possible answer may be that individuals do not have much knowledge about the law, they may feel intimidated by those they consider experts or simply submit to them. But lawyers who are not judges are also part of the debate and are aware of what makes it more difficult to accept that differences over the law are always cases of error or inaccuracy.28 While many cases can be described as cases of error and inaccuracy, other cases require an alternative explanation. Understanding that errors and inaccuracy explain all cases offers a picture of the practice that many participants would refuse. Therefore, it cannot be a good explanation, at least not as a matter of internal analysis, because it does not take into account the perspective of the participants. 15The thorny semantic argument is therefore not a problem for positivists. Convergence in the identification of the law is not relevant because of the nature of the word or concept (criteria or not), but because it is the result of a conceptual analysis. Using conceptual analysis, positivism concludes that convergence is relevant to the identification of the law, but this does not follow from the assertion that words or concepts require the existence of common criteria.19 provide an accurate characterization of differences of opinion in the legal validity criteria. legal sources and their interpretation. 56 In this area, it can be seen that individuals sometimes refer to different interpretive criteria in order to support different solutions for the same case.
Are these real theoretical divergences that call into question the thesis of the positivists? In this regard, it is important to determine whether what gives the broadest meaning to disagreements is a Dworkin-like re-enactment in which participants attempt to offer the best justification for legal practice. If we take into account the arguments of the lawyers and the way they discuss among themselves, Dworkin`s position does not seem correct. Lawyers often use different arguments to defend their position and try to maximize their likelihood of winning the case. They accumulate different arguments, which makes it difficult to understand that they are taking a coherent philosophical position. And it doesn`t seem that the relevant agents, the judges, are very different in this regard. Very often, they stick to a canon of interpretation that they leave out in other decisions, without highlighting any distinctive feature of the case that would justify the amendment.44 An analysis of the legal repertoire shows that judges are far from participating in theoretical disputes, but constitute a façade of justification to justify their decisions. . . .