Village Green Lease Agreement

Applicant`s annex to 10.   Thomas E. Starks and Henry Curtis Price took their initials regarding the duration of the lease of the listed data.   The lease provided for a deposit of $US 300, a first month`s rent of $US 412 and a monthly rent of $US 494 for the remainder of the rental period.   In connection with the rental application, the tenants completed a form explicitly “considered part of the rental agreement”, id. at 21, which listed their current addresses.   On 6 June 1998, the tenants also signed a “Cablevision Addendum” in which they agreed to pay $20 for the first month`s cable TV bill and then $24 per month for cable TV.   These fees were included in the total rents shown above. Unable to subscribe to the email address. Please try again. (2) the amount of the damage suffered or that the lessor has suffered or will reasonably suffer as a result of the tenant`s non-compliance with the law or the lease;  and the tenants assert that Village Green did not fulfil the above-mentioned notification obligation because it did not send them, within forty-five days of the end of the occupation, a disaggregated list of the damages for which Village Green intended to withhold the bond.   Village Green indicates that its obligation to provide an individual list will only be triggered when the tenant has provided it with a redirect address to which the individual list can be sent.   See Lae v.

Householder, 789 N.E.2d 481 (ind.2003).   Village Green claims that the physical occupants of the apartment – Thomas D. Starks and Jeremy Price – did not leave a redirect address.   The tenants replied that they – Herman Curtis Price and Thomas E. Starks – also tenants under the lease and Village Green had its redirect addresses from the beginning.   The court considered and rejected the tenant`s argument in this regard and stated: “The defendants were not `tenants` under Ind`s Bail Restitution Act. Code 32-31-3-12, since the term “tenant” is defined in code ind.32-31-3-10 as a person who lives in a rental unit”. Applicant`s annex to 7. In essence, the court ruled that the fathers, because they had not physically moved into the apartment they rented with and for their sons, were not “tenants”, and therefore it did not matter that Village Green knew their addresses (the fathers) because theirs were not the tenants` addresses.

  We conclude that this interpretation is too restrictive. A lease agreement imposes certain obligations, rights and obligations with respect to the leased premises.   See Hendrickson v. Alcoa Fuels, Inc., 735 N.E.2d 804 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).   The lease agreement was expressly entrusted to Thomas E. in the present case. Starks and Herman Curtis give the right to “occupy and use” the apartment for residential purposes.   Applicant`s annex to 10.   Apparently, they had the right to live in the apartment, they had negotiated and paid themselves.

  The fact that they decided not to stay there physically does not change the fact that they had the right to do so.   In this regard, we note that, although they were essentially guarantors in this situation, the parents were more than that under the terms of the lease.   That is, both fathers were listed as “residents” on the front of the lease.  The lease provided that their sons would “occupy the premises in addition to the residents listed above.”[.]”  Id. (highlighted only here).   Given these aspects of the lease, the parents` “resident” status was not altered by the fact that their sons lived in the apartment, but they did not.   In these facts, we do not tend to consider “resident” as a descriptive term, but as a significant status.   Similarly, in this context, “Occupy” does not require an actual physical presence, but rather refers to the legal right to maintain a real physical presence. . . .